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A B S T R A C T
The key research question that this article aims to respond to is: what are the individual-level eﬀects of wages
ﬁnanced by development assistance? Our hypothesis is that these eﬀects are substantial and overall positive,
depending on the level of analysis. This article theorizes about unintended wage eﬀects at the individual level,
spillover eﬀects, and those at the macro level, yet focuses its research on individual-level eﬀects. The empirical
part consists of two case studies. One takes a sample of grants from a donor agency, the Netherlands Ministry of
Foreign Aﬀairs, as a starting point, following these grants through the aid chain to determine local staﬃng costs.
The other case study consists of a comparative wage analysis in a developing country, the Democratic Republic
of Congo. As this ﬁeld of research is rather fresh, instead of answering relevant questions with respect to wage
eﬀects, this study merely aims to identify questions that merit further research.
1. Introduction
Unintended eﬀects of international cooperation have been little
researched and, if they are included, the emphasis is principally on the
negative unintended eﬀects (Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and Radoud
University, 2017). This article aims to complement this by researching
(potentially) positive unintended eﬀects of development aid.
The article focuses on the often-overlooked wage eﬀects of inter-
national aid. Wage eﬀects of foreign aid, as deﬁned in this article, are
consequences of expenditures on personnel by foreign aid–funded
agencies for citizens of developing countries. This means that the article
focuses both on the eﬀects on wages of individuals (are they higher than
what they would otherwise have been?) and on other aspects (how are
these wages being used?). This article identiﬁes three diﬀerent levels
where those wage eﬀects can be observed: at the individual level, the
spillover level, and the macro level. The empirical research focuses on
the individual-level eﬀects. Certainly, in a period where aid agencies
increasingly employ national staﬀ (employees who are nationals of the
respective countries being served), this is a timely subject to in-
vestigate.
While initial case study research has demonstrated that there are
positive and substantial eﬀects for national staﬀ of foreign aid–funded
agencies, these have neither been theorized nor analyzed systematically
(Kamanzi, 2017a, 2017b; Leenstra, 2017). This article attempts to ﬁll
this gap by (1) providing an analytic overview of various (potential)
eﬀects of the wages provided to national staﬀ by foreign aid, at the
individual, spillover, and macro levels; (2) providing some preliminary
ﬁndings with respect to the size and nature of the wage eﬀects at the
individual level by means of two case studies; and (3) discussing the
ﬁndings to propose additional research questions.
This research will indicate that hundreds of thousands of national
staﬀ of foreign-funded agencies depend for their living on the wages
oﬀered by development assistance. By employing these individuals,
international donors have unknowingly impacted millions of in-
dividuals and their kin. This exploratory research aims to open this
black box and ﬁnd out how large these eﬀects are and if they are
changing over time. The ultimate aim of this research is to determine
what can be done to capitalize on the positive unintended eﬀects and
what can be done to avert negative unintended eﬀects. However, this
article does not reach that stage yet: ﬁrst, a better understanding of this
black box of “wage eﬀects” is needed.
2. Scoping the subject: potential wage eﬀects of foreign aid in
developing countries
Volumes of thick books have been written on whether aid works
(i.e., contributes to poverty reduction), yet the jury is still out
(Easterley, 2007; Riddell, 2008; Sachs, 2006). Most of this literature has
looked at the eﬀectiveness of aid on the basis of its (presumed) intended
eﬀects. Unintended eﬀects have been little researched, and if they are
included the emphasis is principally on the negative unintended eﬀects.
This article aims to counterbalance this by researching (potentially)
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positive unintended eﬀects of development aid, notably the wage ef-
fects of foreign aid.
While there is a dearth of literature on the wage eﬀects of foreign
aid, there is a wealth of literature on the wage eﬀects of foreign direct
investments. Earlier work has shown that the insights and tools of the
economic literature, in this case labor economics, can contribute as well
to a better understanding of development actors (Koch, 2009). Also, in
the case of the wage eﬀects of foreign aid, one can learn from the wage
eﬀects of foreign direct investment, as this has been researched for
decades already (Feenstra, 1997; Gorg & Greenaway, 2004; Javorcik,
2014). Foreign direct investments come from diﬀerent sources (mostly
private rather than public actors) and go to diﬀerent targets (also
mostly private actors as opposed to public ones). Conversely, there are
also many similarities; e.g., both forms of capital require skilled man-
power, and with the foreign ﬂows come international standards that
need to be adhered to. In our analytical framework, key terms from the
management and labor economics literature will be used where ap-
propriate. Studies of wage eﬀects in that literature focus on three levels,
which will be dealt with here as well.
2.1. Individual-level eﬀects
It is assumed that the individual-level wage eﬀects are mostly po-
sitive if they are analyzed from an income-level perspective, as the
wages in the aid sector are generally higher than in other sectors
(Carnahan, Gilmore, & Rahman, 2005). These direct remuneration ef-
fects can occur for national staﬀ1 in local NGOs which are funded by
external aid funding, in international NGOs, in UN and bilateral donor
agencies operating in developing countries, and in UN and bilateral
donor headquarters employing national staﬀ. The eﬀects come mostly
in the form of salary, but also per diems and other allowances, which
compound the wage eﬀect (Vian, Miller, Themba, & Bukuluki, 2013).
Besides, another more informal ﬁnancial eﬀect of being an employee of
an aid-funded agency is possible: illicit ﬁnancial payments extorted
from amongst other suppliers (Koch, 2016a). This study, however, will
focus only on the oﬃcial wage eﬀects, as the study uses oﬃcial doc-
umentation from the aid agencies, which do not include records of
those illicit ﬁnancial ﬂows.
The FDI literature also highlights that workers within foreign-
funded organizations will increase their productivity because of their
exposure to technology and training. They will take this higher pro-
ductivity with them when one day they move on from the foreign-
funded agency and increase the productivity, and hence wages, of the
non-foreign-funded sectors of the economy (Javorcik, 2014). While it is
important to realize that these are broader eﬀects, this paper doesn’t
analyze those empirically.
There are various other eﬀects at the individual level for a foreign-
funded agency which go beyond the wage eﬀect. Individual-level ef-
fects could include, for instance, the values and behavior that local aid
workers are exposed to and that they may internalize. These are the
socialization and homogenization eﬀects of western norms and educa-
tion on local organizations and their national employees, such as
gender norms. Because of various pressures (e.g., funding), local orga-
nizations and their employees increasingly emulate their funding
agencies and their employees (Kamstra & Schulpen, 2015). To illustrate
this eﬀect on values and behavior, the degree to which national staﬀ is
politically active could be a litmus test. International NGOs are often
depoliticized, and staﬀ members are not expected to be politically ac-
tive’ (Banks, Hulme, & Edwards, 2015). Regularly strong leaders of civil
society movements are integrated as staﬀ members in international
NGOs, and cannot still be as vocal as before. While these are all
interesting and relevant eﬀects of employment with foreign-funded
agencies, they are not the focus of this paper, which focuses on wage
eﬀects.
2.2. Meso-level eﬀects
Next to these direct individual-level wage eﬀects, there are also
eﬀects that go beyond the national staﬀ and ﬂow over to their sur-
roundings (Carnahan et al., 2005). These meso-level eﬀects are often
referred to as secondary eﬀects. Kamanzi (2017a, 2017b) has identiﬁed
how local district oﬃcials in Tanzania received aid-funded stipends,
which were invested in a highly relevant way in income-generating
activities for their retirement: investment in their housing, their plots,
and livestock. These positive eﬀects had a trickledown eﬀect on their
families: hence, the aid most deﬁnitely had meso-level eﬀects for both
the families and other relations of the national staﬀ.
The meso-level eﬀects are spread not only to contemporaries, but
also to succeeding generations. These wage eﬀects do not occur si-
multaneously with the intervention, but occur afterwards and are thus
diachronic (Jabeen, 2017). In follow-up research Kamanzi (2017a,
2017b) returned 10 years after the end of the program to the district
oﬃcials in Tanzania and found that their children attended good
schools and now had a better chance to get jobs. Leenstra (2017)
conﬁrms this and shows how children of foreign aid–funded staﬀ were
successful in making a large leap in socioeconomic status in one gen-
eration due to human capital accumulation.
It is important to take note of these meso-level eﬀects of wages in
the analytical framework, as to realize that there are potential multi-
plier eﬀects of the wages. However, these are not analyzed quantita-
tively in this paper, as the focus is on individual-level eﬀects.
2.3. Macro-level eﬀects
Various eﬀects of the employment of nationals at foreign aid–-
funded agencies exist at the macro level. The macro-level eﬀects that
have been identiﬁed in the literature are: (1) reduction of state capacity
in the short run; (2) distortion of labor market in the long run; and (3)
inﬂationary pressures on other wages (Ammitzboell, 2007).
One of the most often-cited eﬀects is the reduction of state capacity
in the short run. This situation arises when a high-paying international
agency enters into a depressed labor market, as is often the case when
aid agencies enter a developing country. The foreign-funded agency
will “suck away” the most talented people from the government, or
from local NGOs. In the case of Kosovo, a cleaning lady for an inter-
national organization could earn three times as much as a minister. The
eﬀect may be that transitory organizations reduce the capacity of more
permanent local institutions (Hariss, 2006). The latter then falls under
what Archarya et al. (2006, p. 7) call indirect transaction costs, with
“illpaid public servants…signiﬁcantly [increasing] their formal salaries
by working ‘for’ aid agencies and projects” with the consequence of
“draining the public service of valuable experiences and talents.”
It is argued that this reduction in state capacity is not just a short-
term eﬀect, but has long-term repercussions. Once national staﬀ have
worked in the environment of an international organization, with its
airconditioned oﬃces and steady electricity, it is hard for them to move
back to the government. While the idea was, for instance in Cambodja,
that national staﬀ of the UN would move back to the public sector after
the international intervention had ended, the reality was that local staﬀ
didn’t do that (Carnahan et al., 2005, p. 36).
A last macro-level eﬀect is related to the inﬂationary pressures on
wages and other aspects of life. This, in turn, leads to inﬂationary
pressure on, among other things, rent in the cities with a large number
of UN agencies (especially since this often also implies many ex-
patriates). In some instances, this forces the local middle class to leave
the city (Büscher & Vlassenroot, 2010).
In addition to the above-mentioned macro-level eﬀects, which have
1 National staﬀ refers to citizens of developing countries who work for foreign aid–-
funded projects, programs, and agencies. In this article “national staﬀ” can also be em-
ployed outside of the country of origin.
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been studied with respect to aid inﬂows, there are also other macro
eﬀects that could be expected on the basis of the foreign direct in-
vestment literature. Firstly, because of backward linkages with the
economy, foreign-funded agencies will also create demand for out-
sourced services, such as auditing or IT services. This increased demand
for services, and will stimulate the labor market (Gorg & Greenaway,
2004; Javorcik, 2014). A ﬁnal macro-level eﬀect on wages of FDI that
has been identiﬁed is an increase in wage inequality at the macro level
(Feenstra, 1997). Unfortunately, quite a number of the unintended
macro-level eﬀects are negative, and they could oﬀset at least partially
the unintended positive eﬀects at the individual level.
2.4. The pyramid structure of the foreign aid–funded labor market
To unpack the black box of wage eﬀects of foreign aid, the structure
of this foreign aid–funded labor market needs to be understood. Often
labor markets are referred to as being pyramid-structured (Blossfeld,
2008), which also appears to be the case for the foreign aid–funded
labor market. While analyzing both the relevant literature and the ﬁ-
nancial and narrative statements of the aid agencies, an employment
pattern emerges. Time and again the structure of the aid-funded labor
market for national staﬀ manifests itself in the form of a pyramid.
Therefore, we argue that the foreign-funded labor market for national
staﬀ could be represented by this ﬁgure.
Quite a bit of research has been done on the remuneration gap
between expatriate and national staﬀ (Carr, McWha,
MacLachlan, & Furnham, 2010; Marai et al., 2010). The conclusion is
often that the wage gap between expatriate and local staﬀ needs to be
reduced as it leads to a demotivation of local staﬀ (Munthali,
Matagi, & Tumwebaze, 2010). However, there are also signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between national staﬀ, depending on the type of organization
they work for.
At the top of the pyramid is a national of a developing country who
is working as an expatriate in another country. His or her wages are
pegged at the international level. For the United Nations this is done
using the Noblemaire principle. This states that the international civil
service should be able to recruit staﬀ from its member states, including
the highest-paid. Therefore, the salaries of professional staﬀ are set with
reference to the highest-paying national civil service (United Nations,
2017).
At a second layer of the pyramid are the national staﬀ working for
UN agencies or bilateral donors. They set their wages through com-
parative annual salary benchmarking studies at the national level. For
instance, in the case of the Netherlands, local embassies need to do an
annual salary review of ﬁve other embassies/bilateral aid agencies (the
“markers” are local oﬃces of the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, Germany, and the European Union). The government of the
Netherlands bases its local wages and conditions on this annual
benchmarking exercise (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2016).
The third layer in the pyramid comprises those national staﬀ
members working for international NGOs to which UN agencies and
other donors provide funds to implement projects. These international
NGOs also engage in salary benchmarking exercises, albeit in a less
formalized way, and for their exercises peer organizations are used.
On the last layer of the pyramid are local staﬀ members working for
local NGOs and CBOs (community-based organizations), some of which
depend on contributions from their members alone (hence hardly of-
fering a salary for their staﬀ), but most of which receive more di-
versiﬁed funding from aid agencies. Their salaries often depend more
on the availability of funds than on strict adherence to salary scales
(Swidler &Watkins, 2009).
There are also foreign aid–funded wage eﬀects which fall outside of
this pyramid, notably those eﬀects accruing in the (semi)public sector
in developing countries, and their civil servants. Foreign donors have
often supported jobs in the public administration of developing coun-
tries (hence, outside this pyramid). They did this either directly through
sectoral programming, for instance in the health and education sector,
or indirectly, through general budget support (IOB Operations and
Evaluations Department, 2011). In the health sector, for instance, do-
nors were active in health worker retention schemes. These foreign-
funded schemes provided a topping-up in salary and other beneﬁts for
doctors to work in rural areas (Gow, George, Mwamba,
Ingombe, &Mutinta, 2013).2
Leenstra (2012, p. 301) highlights the wage eﬀects of these types of
programs and notes the following: “Health workers have been provided
incomes through salaries, allowances and other opportunities, which
have allowed them to accumulate assets and to further invest in their
own human and social capital and that of their kin… The secondary
beneﬁts will not have been the direct aim of the polities and invest-
ments in questions, but these achievements are not dead-weight losses
per se…in fact this has contributed to the further formation of a middle-
class”.
It is not easy to determine if most wage eﬀects occur within or
outside this pyramid system. The Paris Action Agenda for Aid
Eﬀectiveness (2005) aimed to promote the use of country systems for
the disbursement of aid, and for a while the use of sector and general
budget support came relatively more into vogue. There was a clear push
to reduce the number of parallel Project Implementation Units (which
fall outside the government, and inside this pyramid). However, this
commitment to make more use of the government systems of devel-
oping countries and reduce parallel systems has not fully materialized
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). The
potential size and impact of this transition in the aid sector will be
considered at greater length in the discussion section.
In sum, while the pyramid ﬁgure provides an insight into the gen-
eral structure of the labor market for developing country nationals, the
question that will be researched in the empirical section of the paper is
on the size of the diﬀerent segments, the width of the base, and the
angles, i.e., the particular shape of the pyramid.
2.5. Exploring the linkages between wage eﬀects and poverty
With regard to the linkages between these foreign-funded wages and
poverty, there are two mechanisms to look at: the direct eﬀects and the
indirect linkages. For the direct eﬀects, the bottom layer of the pyramid
is the most relevant category. Findings from case studies in Malawi
indicate that national staﬀ working for local NGOs and CBOs often live
close to or around the poverty line (Swidler &Watkins, 2009). If they
receive a steady allowance from the local NGO or CBO, they could be
lifted out of poverty.
However, assuming that staﬀ members would share their wealth
with kin, the meso-level eﬀects on poverty would be much higher at the
top end of the pyramid: with an internationally pegged salary based on
the pay rates of Swiss civil servants, many more family members can be
sustained and lifted out of poverty than with the local NGO salary. Most
wide-ranging poverty eﬀects can be achieved if local staﬀ succeed in
entering the aid pyramid at the bottom and, during their careers, move
up the aid pyramid. In that case they ﬁrst succeed in overcoming their
own poverty (individual level eﬀects) and, while reaching towards the
top of the pyramid, can now start spreading the wealth to their kin
(meso-level eﬀects).
The foreign-funded labor market for developing country nationals is
highly stratiﬁed, as will become clearer in the case study, and the re-
muneration eﬀects are highest for those people who succeed in
breaking through these strata. For those who succeed in creating this
upward mobility in the foreign-funded employment market pyramid,
the eﬀects on standards of living are enormous, and comparable to the
economic eﬀects of successful migration (Collier, 2014).
2 There are also ‘pyramids within the pyramid’ as within the organizations the higher
ranking staﬀ are fewer and earn more than the (more abundant) lower-level staﬀ.
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3. Methodology
This study uses various methods to explore the size and nature of
individual-level wage eﬀects of foreign aid in developing countries. To
obtain a general insight into the number of people in developing
countries who experience a direct wage eﬀect, a quantitative review of
developing country staﬃng levels of major international-aid-funded
agencies has been undertaken. After this more general quantitative
overview, two cases are analyzed in more depth so as to shed light on
the nature and size of the eﬀects (positive or negative) and their size.
The ﬁrst case study uses an aid-chain analysis perspective (Martens,
Mummert, Murrell, & Seabright, 2002). Starting from the donor ﬁles in
one donor country, this study analyzes what the size of the wage eﬀects
can be. Often, staﬃng costs are not made very explicit in external ﬁ-
nancial documents of organizations. However, it was possible to get
access to the internal ﬁnancial documents at the Netherlands Ministry
of Foreign Aﬀairs of one thematic department. In 2015, the Netherlands
was the seventh-largest donor country among members of the OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), spending US $5.7 billion on
net ODA (in 2015 prices). Lastly, to get a sense of whether there was an
increase or decrease over time of wage eﬀects for local staﬀ, changes in
the staﬃng composition of some of the major NGOs in the Netherlands
were analyzed in more detail. As the title of the paper indicates, it is
merely exploratory and can support the identiﬁcation of further re-
search questions.
The second case study starts at the other end of the aid chain, in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. The aim of this case study was to get
more insight into the net wage eﬀects. A comparative wage analysis was
performed at the three domestic layers of the labor market pyramid: in-
country donor agencies, international NGOs, and local NGOs. The
wages in those strata were juxtaposed to wages at the governmental
level with similar qualiﬁcations. Once again, most of these data are
conﬁdential, but it was possible to get access to them on the condition
that the name of the organization wouldn’t be disclosed. The full and
supporting data are available–in an anonymous format–upon request.
The Democratic Republic of Congo received on average US $2.6 billion
between 2012 and 2014 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 2016). It receives most aid in the social sectors, but also
signiﬁcant amounts of humanitarian aid (17%). Also, there is a large
peacekeeping mission, and various elements of support to that peace-
keeping can also be labeled as Oﬃcial Development Assistance. Simi-
larly, as with the case study of grants from the government of the
Netherlands, the aim of the case study is not to answer all questions
with respect to wage eﬀects, but to explore potential eﬀects and identify
areas for further research.
4. An exploration of the size and nature of the foreign aid–funded
labor market for national staﬀ
4.1. General overview of number of foreign aid–funded jobs for nationals of
developing countries
One the methods to get a sense of the size of the eﬀect of individual-
level wage eﬀects in developing countries of foreign-aid funding is to
look at the size of aid agencies and the number of staﬀ they employ.
This is rather easy to do for the upper part of the labor market pyramid
shown, as detailed ﬁnancial and employment information are readily
available. At the top end of the labor market are the donor agencies and
the UN agencies (and, within that stratum, the expatriate jobs were the
premium jobs). The middle of the pyramid consists of the international
NGOs, and, since they provide detailed information in their annual
reports and there are not that many of them, the number of their local
staﬀ can also be analyzed. For local NGOs and CBOs it was not possible
to analyze this information, due to data and time constraints.
Quantitative desk research has shown that there were more than
100,000 jobs for developing country nationals, with agencies such as
the GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaftfür Internationale Zusammenarbeit),
UNICEF, and the peacekeeping missions. Only donor and UN agencies
employing more than 1000 national staﬀ are included, which leads to
nine organizations being included. The peacekeeping missions are a
special case: the soldiers who are part of the mission can only take
home a portion of the extra earnings of participation in a peacekeeping
mission.
The International NGOs (NGOs operating in more than one country)
employ more national staﬀ than the UN and donor agencies; a ﬁrst
online analysis of major NGOs worldwide shows that they employ over
400,000 national staﬀ across the globe. Most of the agencies in the top
10 are household names, yet there are also some lesser-known orga-
nizations, notably organizations from Bangladesh that were successful
domestically, and have now branched out globally, such as BRAC and
Grameen. There is also, for example, the Aga Khan Development
Network, which might be less known but still employs around 70,000
national staﬀ as nurses and teachers. All 27 international NGOs that
matched the criteria (more than 1000 employees), 27, were included in
the sample (Table 1).
It is interesting to note that the relative share of national staﬀ in
international NGOs appears to be on the rise. A numerical analysis of
the distribution of staﬃng of the four largest international NGOs from
the Netherlands in Fig. 1 indicates, for instance, that the share of na-
tional staﬀ has increased signiﬁcantly in two out of the four cases.
4.2. Case study 1: local wage costs in grants from Netherlands ministry of
foreign aﬀairs
The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs is the ﬁrst responsible
ministry for the disbursement of Oﬃcial Development Assistance by the
Netherlands. Within the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs there are various
departments, and for the purpose of this study it was possible to gain
access to the ﬁnancial documents of the Inclusive Green Growth de-
partment, which deals with climate, water, and nutrition security pro-
jects, among other things. To get an insight into the individual-level
wage eﬀects, three projects were randomly selected, stratiﬁed by the
implementation channel; one project was administered by a multi-
lateral agency, one by a civil society agency (NGO), and one by a bi-
lateral implementing agency (through delegated cooperation). To be
selected, the grants needed to be ongoing and the agency needed to be
willing to cooperate. The projects selected are examples and can illus-
trate the relative importance of local staﬃng costs, but cannot be
generalized.
For all three of those cases, answers to the following questions were
obtained: (1) What was the budget provided by the Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, and what was the total size of the budget?
(2) How many steps were there in this aid chain? (2) How many local
staﬀ members did the various actors in the chain employ? (3) What
percentage of the staﬀ salary was supported by the Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs? (4) What were the total local staﬃng costs
supported by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs at every step
in the aid chain? (identiﬁed as chain partner 1, chain partner 2, etc.) (5)
What percentage of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs’ con-
tribution was spent on local staﬃng costs (Table 2)?
The ﬁgures show that there is a wide variety in the relative im-
portance of local staﬃng costs. For the multilateral program, the total
Table 1
Foreign aid–funded agencies and national staﬀ (2014).
Source: own data; full details can be found in Annex 1.
Type of organization Total number of staﬀ Number of national staﬀ
Subtotal donor agencies 202,258 118,541
Subtotal international NGOs 457,455 419,107
Totals 665,713 537,648
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local staﬃng costs reached 25% of the subsidy. They have a long aid
chain, stretching from the governing body, to the implementing orga-
nization, to the prime subsidiary (international NGOs), to the secondary
subsidiary (grassroots organizations). Of the total project of 31 million
Euro, about 8.5 million Euro is spent on staﬃng costs; and a total of 221
jobs were (co)-ﬁnanced. At the other extreme is the bilateral coopera-
tion project, which works through a government agency in a developing
country. No local staﬃng costs are paid, also no governmental salaries,
except for one ﬁnance assistant in the project implementation unit,
representing 2% of the budget. The civilateral project, operating
through an international NGO (and its local NGO counterparts), is in
the middle between those two extremes. It spends about 15% of the
Netherlands-funded budget on local staﬀ costs and co-ﬁnance about 69
local staﬃng positions. In total about 291 jobs were (co)-ﬁnanced by
these three projects.
To conclude the case study, it is also worth inquiring whether there
are trends in wage eﬀects for developing country nationals. Even
though it is hard to establish if there has been a trend, it is clear that,
from the political level, there has been a push to reduce dependence on
expatriate workers (Herfkens, 2000). In general, there has been a push
for “localization” (United Nations Secretary General, 2016), which
means that local and national actors should get a bigger role in
development programs. This appears to be reﬂected in the general
tendency of the traditional four Dutch co-ﬁnancing NGOs, which have
an increasing number of ﬁeld oﬃces and employ increasingly local staﬀ
(Fig. 2).
This is important in the context of this study as it indicates that
national staﬀ are playing an increasingly important role in development
Fig. 1. Foreign aid–funded labor market for devel-
oping country nationals.
Table 2







Total NL MFA support
Total ﬁnancing of Netherlands Ministry of
Foreign Aﬀairs
3,15,08,700 35,22,392 90,00,000 4,40,31,092
Total budget of program 3,44,05,287 44,91,582 2,40,00,000
Number (max) of agencies in the aid-chain 4 2 2




Overhead 8% (excluding direct staﬀ
costs)
Staﬀ members from developing countries 18 1
Chain partner 2 Overhead: 7% (no direct staﬀ
costs)
Oﬃces of local ministries built, no
staﬃng costs
Staﬀ members from developing countries 38 51
Chain partner 3
Staﬀ members from developing countries 177
Chain partner 4 6
Total of staﬀ members of developing
countries
221 69 1 291
Percentage of national staﬀ salary covered
by MFA NL
0.53 0.34 1.00
Total local staﬃng costs 85,57,653 5,42,317 1,50,000 92,49,970
Local staﬃng costs as share of total 0.25 0.15 0.02 0.21
Fig. 2. Localization of composition of international NGO staﬀ.
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cooperation and consequently that, if there is a trend with respect to
individual-level wage eﬀects in developing countries, this trend might
be upward.
4.3. Case study 2: comparative wage analysis in the DRC
While it is important to understand the size of the foreign aid–-
funded labor market, it is not suﬃcient to determine the net poverty
eﬀects. To assess these, it is necessary to determine what the earnings of
those individuals would have been otherwise. Once again, un-
fortunately, little systematic research has been undertaken. One of the
obstacles is that many international (aid) agencies are reluctant to share
their wage scales. This obstacle has been overcome in this research by
guaranteeing anonymity.
One study (Carnahan et al., 2005) has taken as a starting point that
the counterfactual ought to be employment in the public sector. That
approach has been followed in this study. In the third column of Table 3
(below), it is made clear what the oﬃcial wage of civil servants in the
DRC is, split down by skill level. In the second column, an example is
given of a local NGO funded by international development assistance;
while this is not necessarily representative, it is illustrative. Conse-
quently, there are four columns reserved for international actors: an
American NGO, a European NGO, an embassy, and the United Nations.
The national civil servant salary for low-skilled workers is very close
to the oﬃcial minimum wage (SMIG) in the DRC: $3 ($78 USD per
month). The contrast is very stark with the United Nations (UN). The
UN applies the “Flemming principle” in setting local wages. This pro-
vides that the conditions of service for locally recruited staﬀ should
reﬂect the best prevailing conditions found locally for similar work
(United Nations Human Resources Mangement Oﬃce, 2016). Looking
at the low-skilled laborers at the UN, such as cleaning personnel, they
earn about $1164 per month. Interestingly, in many cases the United
Nations–hampered by the excessive costs of its own pay scales–has
started to outsource the low-skilled work (Carnahan et al., 2005). Yet,
the UN drivers aren’t outsourced and earn considerably more than the
doctors working in governmental hospitals or judges in the DRC.
Signiﬁcantly, it is not just the United Nations that is paying much
more than the national government; the international NGOs also oﬀer
considerably higher wages. A ﬁnance assistant earns $87 when working
for the government, but $583 working for the American NGO and $709
working for the European NGO in the sample. The embassy in this
sample appears to be taking a middle position between the United
Nations and the international NGOs. The ﬁgures in this picture conﬁrm
the pyramid-style representation of the labor market for developing
country nationals in the foreign aid–funded sector: the higher on the
food chain, the higher the wages; and the closer to the ultimate
beneﬁciaries, the lower the wages.
The local NGO takes a middle position between the international
NGOs and the local government: its salaries vary between $80 and $592
per month. The GDP per capita in the DRC is US $720 per year, so with
a salary of $960 per year, the local NGO employee is earning above
average, and can reach $7104 a year, which is ten times the average of
the nation. This might still seem like a lot, but relatively speaking it is
not, as the Congolese director of the European NGO earns 50 times the
average salary ($36,120 annually).
Lastly, while not in this table (as this table looks only at the wages in
the DRC), it is also noteworthy to look at expatriate wages for
Congolese. If a Congolese national started working for an UN agency in
a neighboring country, such as the Central African Republic, he/she
would end up at the top of the pyramid. For example, if a Congolese is
working on a P-4 UN contract (e.g., as a Head of Unit of UNICEF, in
Bangui), has one dependent and a couple of years of experience, he/she
will receive tax-free about US $15,000 per month (excluding schooling
and rental allowances).3
In sum, the individual-level eﬀects appear to be substantial: a
technical expert working for the government earns $100 a month, and
22 times as much if working for a donor agency, such as an embassy.
The question that remains is: what is the relative importance of these
foreign aid–funded jobs in the economy? This could provide more in-
sight into the importance of the wage eﬀects.
It is striking how little information can be found on this topic: the
Platforme de Gestion de l’Aide et Investissement of the Congolese Ministry
of Planning is oﬄine. The International Aid Transparency Initiative
only lists 56 projects in DRC, and the OECD DAC development ﬁnance
portal doesn’t have a detailed sector code for wage costs. Hence, no
estimations can be made of the total wage eﬀect in the DRC. However,
from the literature on aid in the DRC, three patterns emerge. One re-
lates to the uneven geographic distribution of wage eﬀects, the second
relates to the tendency of increased localization, and the last one to the
increased use of national governmental country systems.
Firstly, aid and aid-funded organizations are very unevenly spread
in the DRC (Koch, 2016b). Whereas in some provinces there is hardly
any inﬂux of foreign funding, such as in the provinces formally known
as the Kasai, there is much more funding in the Kivus. The city of Goma,
in North Kivu, is one of those areas where the wage eﬀect is substantial:
“The expansion of the humanitarian sector was associated with a
Table 3
Comparative wage analysis in the DRC- sample.
Local gross salaries (including beneﬁts) in the DRC
Category Example Local government* Local NGO American NGO European NGO European embassy United Nations***
Year 2014 2015 2014 2016 2016 2014
Low-skilled workers Guard, cleaning staﬀ $ 78 $ 80 $ 191 $ 299 $ 787 $ 1164
Semi-skilled workers Driver, receptionist $ 84 $ 117 $ 317 $ 398 $ 1057 $ 1339
Skilled workers Finance assistant $ 87 $ 141 $ 593 $ 709 $ 1534 $ 2570
Highly skilled workers Technician $ 92 $ 232 $ 732 $ 948 $ 2245 $ 3614
Management staﬀ Team leader $ 101 $ 471 $ 1083 $ 1947 $ 2724 $ 7524
Director level Organization head $ 107 $ 592 $ 1240 $ 3010 $ 4025 $ 10,775
Other High ranking soldier (max) $ 102
Experienced teacher (max) $ 120
Doctor (max) $ 1108
Judge (max) $ 1181
*Source: Ministère du Budget (2014) Tableau Synoptique De L’Evolution Barémique Par Secteur De 2007 A Ce Jour (including beneﬁts).
**Exchange rate used: average exchange rate for 2014 = 1260 Congolese Franc for USD.
***Source: United Nations (n.d.) Salaries scales for staﬀ in the general service and related categories.
3 The International Civil Service Commission (2012a) shows a base salary of ap-
proximately US $80,000 USD for a P4 with some experience. The base salary is $100,000.
The multiplier for the CAR was approximately 53%, according to the International Civil
Service Commission (2012b), hence $53,000. Hardship allowance and mobility allowance
are approximately $27,000, making the total salary US $180,000 ($15,000 per month).
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growing demand for trained personnel, guards, cooks and drivers.
Given the lack of state functioning and of employment opportunities,
humanitarian agencies acquired a considerable share of the local labour
market” (Büscher & Vlassenroot, 2010).
A second development that is observed is the move towards “loca-
lization,” which was also observed in the Dutch case study. A revealing
indicator for this is the distribution of the United Nations’
Humanitarian Pooled Fund. Whereas in 2007 only 5.5% of the projects
went to national NGOs (United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator,
2008), this percentage climbed steadily to 22.5% in 2014 (Common
Humanitarian Fund, 2015). This is of importance to the current study,
as this implies that the relative importance of local organizations and
local staﬀ increases, and hence also the wage eﬀects change. There are
two contradictory consequences on the wage eﬀects: on the one hand,
there are fewer expatriates working for local NGOs, so there are more
leadership positions for local staﬀ. However, the wage levels–also for
local staﬀ–are lower, as seen in Table 3, for staﬀ in local NGOs.
A last development relates to the relative size of the pyramid as
compared to total aid funding in a country. As explained in section 2.4,
donor countries have committed themselves to use country systems in-
creasingly for their oﬃcial development assistance, which would entail
less parallel funding being granted and the relative size of the pyramid
decreasing. In the case of the DRC, with improving levels of governance
between 2010 and 2015, more aid was also granted through government
systems (United Nations Development Program, 2016). Whereas in 2011,
only 12% of the development partners were using government budgetary
and public ﬁnancial management systems, this had risen to 42% in 2015
(as a point of reference, for all developing countries combined this in-
creased from 46% to 51%). It is interesting, or worrying, that this alleged
increase of country systems apparently hasn’t translated yet into positive
wage eﬀects for the Congolese civil servants.
5. Discussion on further research questions
Before distilling more detailed questions for further research, it is
appropriate to pause and determine the extent to which the original
research question has been answered: what are the individual-level
eﬀects in developing countries of wages funded by development assis-
tance? The two case studies indicate that these eﬀects are likely to be
positive and substantial for the individuals concerned. The wage dif-
ferential between the public sector wages in the DRC and foreign-
funded agencies was signiﬁcant. The Dutch case study showed that, of
three selected projects, 21% was spent on local wages.
The ﬁrst question that merits discussion is both the internal and
external validity of the case studies. While there is no reason to assume
that there are biases in the selected grants that were analyzed for the
Dutch, or the agencies that were analyzed in the DRC, it is clear that it
concerns just a handful of observations. Also, the Dutch case study fo-
cused on programs from one department only, the Inclusive Green
Growth department. Yet, they cannot be discarded as anecdotal. E.g.
the agencies that shared the pay scales for this research also explained
the process that they used to determine these wage scales. Regularly,
they would organize benchmarking exercises to ensure that their pay is
in line with peers on their layer of the pyramid; hence, while there are
variations between diﬀerent agencies, they are within certain band-
widths. Still, this article should still be considered exploratory. With
respect to external validity, serious concerns can also be raised.
How representative is the Dutch case study with respect to the wage
eﬀects of other donors? In 2015 the Dutch spent about 44% of their aid
using country systems, such as governmental procurement systems
(outside the pyramid scheme), whereas the average for donor countries
was 50% (up from 48% in 2010). Conversely, as other donor countries
slightly increased their use of local country systems, it declined sig-
niﬁcantly in the Netherlands (down from 65% in 2010). There is a large
variance between donors: while USAID, the largest donor, mostly uses
parallel funding mechanisms (less than 21% through the recipient
governments’ systems) and hence has large wage eﬀects, this is much
less the case for a country such as Denmark (89% through national
government systems). Even though the Netherlands scores close to the
average with respect to the use of national systems, it would not be
prudent to generalize the ﬁndings for the Netherlands to other donors.
The representativeness of the DRC with respect to other countries
needs to be explored. On a positive note, other studies have indicated that,
in countries such as Liberia, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone, equally large
wage diﬀerentials appeared to exist between government and United
Nations salaries (Carnahan et al., 2005). The large wage diﬀerential en-
countered in the DRC doesn’t appear to be an exception. Yet, there are also
countries where the relative size of the “pyramid” compared to the wage
eﬀects in the public sector appears to be diﬀerent. In the neighboring
country of Rwanda, 80% of the aid is spent using country systems (United
Nations Development Program, 2016). Also, the wage diﬀerential between
public sector salaries and United Nations staﬀ appears much lower in
Rwanda, as the salaries of civil servants are higher and national UN staﬀ
much lower (Mywage, 2017; United Nations, 2017). The compounded
wage diﬀerential between the government and the UN (from receptionist
to permanent secretary) is a factor of 3.4 in Rwanda and 14.7 in the DRC
(see Annex 2). Hence, it is prudent to be modest about the degree to which
the ﬁndings of the DRC can be generalized, before further research
questions can be formulated.
A prime question that merits further research is the link between the
wage eﬀects and poverty levels, a link that was already alluded to in
section 2.5. It is not clear yet if indeed these wages in foreign-funded
agencies reduce poverty. Research in Malawi has indicated that the
foreign-funded jobs at local NGOs and CBOs are at least a livelihood
strategy for what has been dubbed the “aspiring rural elites”
(Swidler &Watkins, 2009). “The aspiring elites struggle to escape the
subsistence farming and trading of the village and to reach toward the
imagined status and wealth of a job in the formal economy… Since jobs
in the formal sector are scarce, many are unemployed or inconsistently
employed. By village standards, they are an educated elite; by the
standards of the elites who work for NGOs in the capital, they are not
suﬃciently educated to be hired at a high salary to implement donor
projects” (Swidler &Watkins, 2009, p. 7). It is not clear if employment
in these local NGOs and CBOs truly serves as a substantial stepping
stone out of poverty. If that were the case, it would be an interesting
unintended positive eﬀect which contributes to the original aim of
development assistance: poverty reduction.
A second question results from the case study in the DRC. It con-
cerns the eﬀects of this transition from parallel funding mechanisms to
in-country governmental systems. Whereas this is in principle a desir-
able aim toward which the development community strives to work, it
is relevant to study what this entails for the positive individual-level
wage eﬀects for those being employed in the “pyramid.” As the ﬁrst
analysis of the DRC indicated, there has been a rise in the use of country
systems, but public sector wages appear still to be abysmal. Are the
national experts of UN agencies and international NGOs integrated into
the public sector, or do they leave the country and not use their ex-
pertise, as was the case in Cambodia when this transition happened
(Carnahan et al., 2005)? What can be done to ensure that, in this
transition, the right expertise is retained? A number of donors have
started topping up public sector salaries in developing countries, but
how can that be done without creating other distortions and encoura-
ging nepotism (U4 Anti-corruption resource centre, 2013)?
A ﬁnal question relates to the diﬀerent eﬀects of employment and
wages that were touched upon in section 2. What are the meso-level
eﬀects of those wages? What are the macro-level eﬀects of the wages?
Also, while in the present article mostly a labor economics approach is
used, focusing on ﬁnancial eﬀects, there are a myriad of other potential
eﬀects of employment in this pyramid. For example, intermarriage
between expatriate staﬀ and national staﬀ of foreign-funded agencies
has been an unintended eﬀect of international cooperation, and has at
its turn had many long-term, often positive, repercussions for the
D.-J. Koch, L. Schulpen Evaluation and Program Planning 68 (2018) 233–242
239
individuals involved (including migration and remittances). The long-
term welfare eﬀects of these intermarriages of employment are just one
part of the non-ﬁnancial eﬀects that merit further investigation.
6. Conclusion
The key research question that this article aimed to respond to is: what
are the individual-level eﬀects in developing countries of wages funded by
development assistance? The preliminary ﬁnding of this paper is that the
eﬀects are substantial, as over half a million jobs were found to depend on
them within international agencies and NGOs. This excludes all of the jobs
that are created at the level of local NGOs and CBOs.
The two case studies provide telling examples of just how important
those local-level eﬀects can be. In the DRC, if a manager from the public
sector moved from a job in the public sector to an American NGO, she
would earn 10 times as much. If she started to work for the European
NGO in the sample, she would 19 times as much. If she worked for the
bilateral donor agency, she would multiply it by 27 times, or, if she
worked for the United Nations, by 75 times. The individual-level
payoﬀs are enormous and positive; yet in the analytical framework it
was also made clear that the ramiﬁcations at the macro level are likely
to be more negative.
The case study, which started in the Netherlands and analyzed the
wage eﬀect by going through the aid chain, showed that local personnel
costs ranged between 2% and 25% of the total program costs. It is
telling that, despite all these evaluations and the required focus on
unintended eﬀects mandated by the OECD evaluation guidelines, so
little attention has been paid to the eﬀects of these signiﬁcant ex-
penditures.
In sum, this article concludes that the exploration into the in-
dividual-level wage eﬀects is a relevant endeavor, as the eﬀects are
substantial and potentially positive. More interestingly still, these ef-
fects have been unintended. Yet, in the end, more questions have been
raised than have been answered: What has been the eﬀect of all those
wages on poverty levels? What other eﬀects, besides wages, are con-
sequences of employment in these foreign-funded structures?
Answering these questions would shed important light on the unin-
tended eﬀects of development assistance.
Annex 1. Detailed overview of national staﬀ of UN- and donor agencies, and international NGOs.
Type of organization Name organization Total number of staﬀ Number of national staﬀ





Asian Development Bank 3105 1698
DFID 2852 1484
JICA 1845 1107
African Development Bank 1841 1215
Subtotal donor agencies 202,258 118,541
International NGOs BRAC 111,252 111,252
Aga Khan Development Network 80,000 69,600
World Vision 45,000 42,750
MSF 35,000 29,400
Save the Children 27,000 21,600
Association for Social Advancement 20,259 20,259
Partners in Health 18,000 17,640







Action Against Hunger 7133 6113
Danish Refugee Council 6000 5262
World Wildlife Foundation 5000 4850
One Acre Fund 4300 3741
Medecins du Monde 4121 3585
Mercy Corps 4000 3400
FHI360 4000 3800
Concern Worldwide 3513 3181
Handicap International 3146 2462
IRD 2090 1818
Food for the Hungry 2000 1800
Islamic Aid 1759 1686
Gates Foundation 1376 1197
Subtotal international NGOs 457,455 419,107
TOTALS 665,713 537,647
Source: annual reports and annual ﬁnancial statements of organizations, full referencing available
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Annex 2. Snapshot of wage diﬀerential in Rwanda between government and UN salaries (local staﬀ)
Category Example in public
sector















ICT oﬃcer 588 Assistant program
oﬃcer
$ 2137
Mangement Staﬀ Director of planning
unit
784 Program oﬃcer $ 3794
Director level Permanent secretary 1955 Senior program oﬃcer $ 5264
Average $ 786 $ 2650
Wage diﬀerential 3.4
*source: Mywage (2017).
**source: United Nations (2017) http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salaries/rwanda.htm.
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